Predicate Calculus *or* First-Order Logic

Propositional Logic is very restrictive. It can't even describe the basic rules of arithmetic. That's how it manages to be both complete and sound.

We will depart here from the book's way of saying things so that we don't get confused later when we get to Logic programming.

Predicate calculus adds quite a few things on top of propositional logic

 Names beginning with little letters represent constants or functions or predicates

 You can mostly tell which because a function name is always followed by (...), but functions look just like predicates. They just appear in different contexts.

- Constants are the most basic things
	- Constants do not have values, they stand for themselves x means x and nothing more, it is one of the values we work with. But they can represent things:
		- tom is just tom,
		- but we can use tom to represent a particular cartoon cat.
- Functions look like functions in programming languages, but they are not

Here's some functions being used: $f(x)$, father(tom), $g(x, y)$

Functions are not called,

they do not have definitions,

and they don't return anything.

 $father(tom) = father(tom)$ and nothing else

 but father(tom) can be used to represent the father of that cat constants and functions are both kinds of Terms.

• Predicates are what do all the work,

They are sort-of called, and

 they sort-of have values. Every predicate is either true or false prime(X) might be used to find out whether X is prime or not. likes(X, toast) can be used to state that X likes toast.

Variables begin with capital letters

Variables can take on any value: constant or function.

Equality: term = term is also a predicate

Terms are equal if they look the same.

- Universal quantification:
	- \forall X, p(X) means that p(X) is true for all possible values of X
- Existential qualification:

∃ X: p(X) means that there is at least one possible value of X that makes p(X) true.

Here is a small but well-known example:

man(socrates)

 \forall X, man(X) \Rightarrow mortal(X) from which we can deduce: mortal(socrates)

And there are some fairly obvious equivalences, for example:

- \bullet \neg \exists X: *something* \equiv \forall X, \neg *something*
- $\bullet \ \neg \forall X$, *something* = $\exists X$: \neg *something*
- \blacktriangleright \blacktriangleright X: *something* = \neg \exists X: \neg *something*
- ∃ X: *something* ≡ ∀ X: *something*

An example, Kinship

We have a collection of very basic facts:

 female(marge) female(lisa) male(homer) parent(marge, lisa) spouse(marge, homer) and so on

- And some other axioms:
	- \forall M, C, mother(M, C) \Leftrightarrow female(M) \land parent(M, C)
	- \forall H, W, husband(H, W) \Leftrightarrow male(H) \land spouse(H, W)
	- \forall A, B, spouse(A, B) \Leftrightarrow spouse(B, A)
	- $\forall P, C, parent(P, C) \Leftrightarrow child(C, P)$
	- \forall G, C, grandparent(G, C) \Leftrightarrow ∃ P: parent(G, P) \land parent(P, C)
	- \forall A, B, sibling(A, B) \Leftrightarrow A≠B \land ∃ P: parent(P, A) \land parent(P, B)
- From these, we should, in principle, be able to prove some Theorems:
	- \forall A, B, sibling(A, B) \Leftrightarrow sibling(B, A) for example
- But how? Just another search? Gödel again

First-Order Definite Clauses

- Can always be written in the form Antecedents \Rightarrow Consequence
- Antecedents are just ands of predicates
- Consequence is just a predicate
	- $king(X) \wedge greedy(X) \Rightarrow evil(X)$
- When something is always true the antecedents and the arrow are left out
- A Datalog knowledge base: It is a crime for an American to sell weapons to a hostile nation; North Korea is an enemy of America; North Korea has some missiles; all of its missiles were sold to it by Colonel West; Colonel West is an American.

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american(X) \land weapon(Y) \land hostile(Z) \land sold(X, Y, Z) \Rightarrow criminal(X)
missile(X) \Rightarrow weapon(X)
 enemy(northkorea, america) 
enemy(X, america) \Rightarrow hostile(X)
 owns(northkorea, m1) 
 missile(m1)
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 (m1 is a Skolem Constant, introduced because of ∃) missile(X) \land owns(northkorea, X) \Rightarrow sold(colonelwest, X, northkorea) american(colonelwest)

Unifying and Substituting

 Function symbols are not used, just variables, constants, and predicates so Unifying is very simple:

> Unify(p(tom, X), $p(Y, jerry) = \{X \rightarrow jerry, Y \rightarrow tom \}$ Unify(p(tom, X), p(tom, Y)) = ${X \rightarrow Y}$ or maybe ${Y \rightarrow X}$ Unify(p(tom), $p(tom) = \{\}$ Unify($p(tom)$, $p(ierry)$) = fail

- The result of unify is a Substitution or Unifier
- Subst rewrites a formula F according to a substitution *θ*:

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Subst({X \rightarrow jerry, Y \rightarrow tom}, hates(X, Y)) = hates(jerry, tom)
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Subst({X\rightarrowjoe }, human(X) \land wrong(Y)) = human(joe) \land wrong(Y)
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 StandardiseVariables(F) renames all of F's variables with totally new ones StandardiseVariables(human(X) \land hates(Y, X)) =

human(V179) \land hates(V180, V179)

A simple Forward Chaining Inference Procedure

- KB is the Knowledge Base, all those facts above
- Question is a predicate, we want to know if it's true while True:

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inferences = \{ \} for rule in KB: 
   StandardiseVariables(rule) to get (p_1 \wedge p_2 \wedge p_3 \wedge ... \wedge p_n) \Rightarrow qfind some facts r_1, r_2, r_3, ..., r_n in KB
      such that Unify(p_1 \wedge p_2 \wedge p_3 \wedge ... \wedge p_n, r_1 \wedge r_2 \wedge r_3 \wedge ... \wedge r_n) = \thetaand \theta \neq \text{fail} s = Subst(θ, q) 
   if s can not unify with anything in KB or inferences: 
      answer = Unify(s, Question) 
     if answer \neq Fail:
         return answer 
      add s to inferences 
if inferences = \{ \}:
   return False 
 add inferences to KB
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- Implied inner inner loop for the "find some ..."
- Very inefficient indeed
- Can be improved a bit:

Find a fact r₁ that can be unified with p_1 to give θ Then find a fact r₂ that unifies with p_2 in a way consistent with θ Continue doing that until all the p_i 's are covered

Cheapest First Heuristic

- Find a carpenter whose father is a senator
- carpenter(X) \land father(Y, X) \land senator(Y)

We can also define how numbers work:

- number(z)
	- z, which stands for zero here, is a number
- \forall X, number(X) \Rightarrow number(s(X)) here, s stands for "successor": one after X
- $\blacktriangleright \blacktriangleright \blacktriangleright X$, add(z, X, Y) \Leftrightarrow X = Y if it is true that adding z and X gives Y then X and Y are the same
- Zermelo-Fraenkel-Peano axioms
- $\blacktriangleright \blacktriangleright \blacktriangleright X$, add(s(A), X, s(Y)) \Leftrightarrow add(A, X, Y)
- and so on. We can do something like this to define everything Principia Mathematica, Russell and Whitehead
- Because numbers *can* be represented, they are usually just taken for granted. We allow ourselves to write 7 instead of $s(s(s(s(s(s)))))$ and to use +, ×, and all the rest

Syntactic Sugar

- adds nothing real to the language
- but makes things much easier to read
- [a, b, c] can be used to represent a list containing a, b, and c
- but we don't *need* it
- lists can also be defined, linked-list style, without adding anything
- $cons(a, cons(b, cons(c, nil)))$
- many other examples, most of them are completely obvious

More on Unification

- A kind of pattern matching, in a way
- To unify two terms, you find values for all of their variables that make those terms equal
- Unifying cat(tom) with cat(X) tells us that $X =$ tom
- Unifying $add(s(A), X, s(Y))$ with $add(s(s(s(s(z))))$, $s(s(s(s(s(s))))$ tells us that A is $s(s(s(z))), X$ is $s(z)$, and Y is $s(s(s(s(z))))$
- Unifying cat(Tom) with mortal(Tom) fails
- We unify terms that are somehow *supposed* to be equal To find out if they really can be equal (it doesn't fail) And what is required to make them equal: An Instantiation of their variables
- Instantiations can still have variables in them:

Unifying $p(s(A))$ with $p(s(B))$ tells us only that $A = B$ Unifying p(s(A)) with p(A) tells us that A = s(A), it *should* fail The Occurs rule